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Was Mr. Colonna denied effective assistance of

counsel during plea bargaining and throughout the trial:

(a) by

counsel's failure to adequately prepare for trial due to his failure
to properly plea bargain, (b) by counsel's failure to properly
present a defense of entrapment; (c) by counsel's failure to object
to evidence of Mr. Colonna's past offenses and bad character; and
(d) by counsel's failure to move to dismiss the case based on the
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Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) provides:
76-2-303. Entrapment*—(1) It is a defense that the
actor was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a
person directed by or acting in co-operation with the
officer induces the commission of an offense in order to
obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would
be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.
Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit
an offense does not constitute entrapment.
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable when
causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the
offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct
causing or threatening the injury to a person other than
the person perpetrating the entrapment.
(3) The defense provided by this section is available
even though the actor denies commission of the conduct
charged to constitute the offense.
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the court
shall hear evidence on the issue and shall determine as a
matter of fact and law whether the defendant was entrapped
to commit the offense. Defendant's motion shall be made
at least ten days before trial except the court for good
cause shown may permit a later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the defendant was
entrapped, it shall dismiss the case with prejudice, but
if the court determines the defendant was not entrapped,
such issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury
at trial. Any order by the court dismissing a case based
on entrapment shall be appealable by the state.
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where the
defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses of the
defendant shall not be admitted except that in a trial
where the defendant testifies he may be asked of his past
convictions for felonies and any testimony given by the
defendant at a hearing on entrapment may be used to
impeach his testimony at trial.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301(1)(1953 as amended) provides:
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of
committing a robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or
a fascimile of a knife or a deadly weapon; or
(b)

causes serious bodily injury upon another.
viii.

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CONT,
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part:
. . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law;
Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
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Officer Droubay's confidential informant, asking "how do you like
the barrel on this?" (R. 109, 266).
Manny East entered and asked what everyone was doing
there (R. 122). Butch Webber and Officer Droubay told him they were
looking for cocaine (R. 122). Everyone was drinking beer and
Officer Droubay could smell alcohol on Mr. Colonna's breath (R. 123).
Mr. East made a call to see about getting cocaine then
told Officer Droubay that he could get a gram of cocaine for him (R.
126).

Officer Droubay, Mr. East and Mr. Colonna left the Reed home

and drove in Officer Droubay's car to buy some cocaine.

On the way,

the officer stopped for gas and purchased another twelve pack of
beer (R. 128).
After leaving the gas station, all three drank beer in
the vehicle (R. 132). Shortly thereafter, West Valley police pulled
Officer Droubay over for a traffic violation.

The officers cited

him, then allowed Officer Droubay to continue driving after he
informed them surreptitiously that he was an undercover officer (R.
131).

After the incident, Mr. Colonna asked Officer Droubay if he

were a police officer; he replied "no" (R. 132).
Officer Droubay drove to the house where cocaine was
available.

After the night in question, the officer was unable to

identify the house, although he knew it was in the vicinity of 2300
East and 3300 South (R. 128-129, 132-133).

Officer Droubay gave Mr.

East the money to purchase the cocaine and waited in the car,
drinking beer with Mr. Colonna (R. 132-33).

According to the

officer, he had no way of ascertaining how much beer was actually
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Droubay flatly denied actually ingesting the substance (R. 136,
251-252).

- 3 -

Officer Droubay testified that the cocaine caused Mr.
Colonna's behavior to escalate (R. 139). The trio returned to the
Reed house where Officer Droubay became aware that Mr. East had
either purchased an additional bindle of cocaine or received it as
"commission" on the officerfs purchase (R. 140). Mr. East laid out
lines of the cocaine in his bindle on a mirror on the kitchen table
while everyone stood nearby.

The lines were two to three inches

long and an eighth of an inch wide (R. 140-142).

The people

"snorting" the cocaine used a rolled dollar bill to get it from the
mirror on the table to their noses (R. 254). Mr. Colonna and Mr.
East each ingested "a line of cocaine then passed it to Officer
Droubay (R. 142).
Officer Droubay again claimed that he did not actually
ingest the substance (R. 142). Officer Droubay claimed that he used
the bill and his little finger to draw the cocaine along the
mirror.

The mirror was on the edge of the table, and he claimed

that he swept the cocaine off the mirror onto the floor, in front of
all men standing nearby (R. 254).
Mr. Reed testified that when the three men returned to
his house, Officer Droubay opened Mr. Reed's bindle containing a
quarter of a gram of cocaine and took out and ingested a large line
of cocaine (R. 268-270).

He actually saw the officer "snort" this

substance and would have noticed if it fell to the floor (R.
268-69).

He remembers the incident clearly because Droubay did not

offer him any (R. 272). He also saw Officer Droubay smoking
marijuana which the officer had brought with him that evening (R.
268).
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a message or use the phone even though the phone was easily
accessible and used by Mr. East to contact Craig Britton (R. 147,
150).

Officer Droubay may have but could not recall if he gave Mr.

East a quarter for the telephone call (R. 242).
After leaving the bar, Officer Droubay drove the trio to
the home of Craig Britton in Sandy (R. 154, 156). The officer
testified that after Mr. East made the phone call to Mr. Britton, he
had no idea what was "going down" (R. 154). Nevertheless, he
believed he had three choices (even though he had no idea what was
going down) (R. 154):

(1) "identify (himself) as a police officer,

and take the situation from there", (2) "try and get away or bow out
in any way possible" or (3) "go with it and try and maintain the
situation to the best of my ability " (R. 150).
According to Officer Droubay, after he drove the trio to
the Britton house, both Mr. Colonna and Mr. East yelled at Mr.
Britton, and Mr. Colonna pointed a gun at Mr. Britton's midsection
(R. 158, 160). According to Mr. Britton, who testified for the
State, Mr. East did most of the hollering and while all three held
the gun for awhile, Mr. East held it the longest (R. 186) and
pointed it at him and shoved it in his face (R. 193-4, 198). Mr.
Britton testified that Mr. Colonna did not do "a whole lot.

He was

mostly just hollering" (R. 193).
Mr. Britton was most afraid of Officer Droubay (R. 188,
190, 196) since Officer Droubay was the only person wearing gloves
and the only person to hit Mr. Britton (R. 188, 198). The officer
hit Mr. Britton in the back of the head three or four times and
twice on the nose (R. 197). The officer also pulled Mr. Britton's
- 6
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trio went to the house of Mr. Colonna's ex-wife, and apparently
other places as well (R. 172, 247).
After Officer Droubay left Mr. Colonna and Mr. East at
the Reed house at about 4:00 a.m., he went across the street for a
cup of coffee (R. 248). He testified that he "was pretty shook at
that point" (R. 248) even though the incident had occurred several
hours earlier.

He did not call in at that time and testified that

he tried to reach a supervisor as early as 8:00 a.m., but was unable
to make contact with anyone until 1:00 p.m. the next afternoon (R.
208, 247).
Officer Herlynn, Officer Droubay's control officer,
talked with Officer Droubay over the phone at 1:00 to 1:30 p.m. the
next day (R. 208, 210). At that time, he was notably irrational,
"not even making sure what he was saying" and emotionally distraught
(R. 209). Officer Herlynn told him exactly what to do, directed him
where to go, "who to talk to, who not to talk to, because [she]
couldn't believe anything" (R. 209).
Officer Herlynn met Officer Droubay at a convenience
store about an hour later.
and nauseous.

At that time, Officer Droubay was gray

He tried to eat, but could not keep anything down and

even threw up the coffee he drank.

He was sweating profusely even

though it was the middle of December and they were outside.

He was

shaking, paced alot and his voice cracked (R. 225). He had no idea
what he was doing for the ten or so hours after the incident ended
(R. 206).
Officer Herlynn attributed Officer Droubay's physical
condition to the trauma of what he had been through the previous
- 8
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Mr. Colonna's right to due process under the Utah and
United States Constitutions was violated by the outrageous conduct
of Officer Droubay.

Where an officer acts as outrageously as

Officer Droubay did in this case, the judicial processes should not
be used to obtain a conviction.
Defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel.

His performance was deficient and prejudiced the outcome

of the case in the following areas:

(1) Defense counsel failed to

adquately prepare for trial as a result of his failure to properly
plea bargain.

Because he believed Mr. Colonna would enter a plea on

the day of trial rather than go to trial, defense counsel did not
adequately prepare the case; (2) defense counsel did not adequately
present the defense of entrapment.

He failed to file a pretrial

motion or brief the issue so that the judge could properly rule; (3)
defense counsel did not object or move for a mistrial after
testimony regarding Mr. Colonna's prior arrests, bad acts and bad
character was elicited on three separate occasions during direct
examination; and (4) defense counsel did not move to dismiss the
information on the grounds that Mr. Colonna's due process rights
were violated by the Officer's outrageous conduct.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

MR. COLONNA WAS ENTRAPPED AS A
MATTER OF LAW.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) sets forth the
defense of entrapment.

Subsection (1) states:

76-2-303. Entrapment.—(1) It is a defense that
the actor was entrapped into committing the
offense. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
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"induced the commission of the offense by methods creating a
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it" and refused to affirm the conviction
since "the statute condemns the conduct of the state in inducing the
crime as a perversion of the proper standards of administration of
criminal law."

State v. Taylor, supra at 504.

In State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), this
Court found that a reasonable doubt existed as to whether the
defendant committed the offense based on his own initiative and
desire or as the result of persistent requests by the police agent,
and reversed the conviction.

In that case, the undercover agent

worked at a gas dock on a marina on Lake Powell.

He was servicing

defendant's boat and brought up the subject of selling marijuana.
The agent then repeatedly telephoned the defendant, who ultimately
supplied him with the drug.

While this Court acknowledged that the

use of undercover agents in the investigation of drug trafficking is
permissible, the use of such agents "to induce persons who otherwise
would be law abiding into the commission of a crime" is not
tolerable.

Id. at 1240.
In State v. Sprague, 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984) this Court

again found that a defendant was entrapped and reversed the
conviction where the agent approached the defendant and made
repeated requests that the defendant procure drugs.

In that case,

the agent had not previously known the defendant, and had no reason
to believe he or his friend was involved with drugs.
In State v. Cripps, supra, this Court clarified that the
particular circumstances of each defendant be considered in relation
- 12 -

to the police conduct.

Id. at 750. The Cripps' court acknowledged

that the "average person" is not involved in the use of illicit
drugs and rejected a jury instruction which suggested that the
jurors should determine whether the average person would have been
induced to commit the crime.

This Court reaffirmed that the proper

focus under the objective standard is on police conduct, and quoted
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958):
"The crucial question, not easy to answer, to which
the court must direct itself is whether the police
conduct revealed in a particular case falls below
standards to which common feelings respond, for the
proper use of governmental power."
Id. at 750.
In State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131 (Utah 1986), the agent
asked the defendant to sell him cocaine on four occasions; the
defendant complied only on the fourth request.

This Court found

that the defendant was not entrapped as a matter of law, and left
the question to the jury.

In reaching the court's decision, this

Court relied on the fact that the officer knew that the defendant
was a drug user and had previously purchased cocaine at the
defendant's apartment.

Under these circumstances, the officer had

reason to believe that defendant was involved in drug trafficking
and the police conduct was therefore within reasonable bounds.
In State v. Kaufman, 734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987), this Court
reversed a conviction where the defendant was entrapped into
committing the crime of receiving stolen property.

In that case,

the agent was an attractive female who represented herself as a
divorcee with six children and financial difficulties.

She sold

several items of jewelry to a pawnshop owner, claiming that she
- 13 -

needed to sell them to meet her financial obligations.

Later, the

agent told the defendant the items had been stolen, and attempted to
sell additional stolen items to him.

This Court found that the

offenses were not the product of the defendant's initiative or
desire, but were induced by the conduct of the undercover officer.
In the present case, Officer Droubay's conduct was more
outrageous that that exhibited by officers in the entrapment cases
previously decided by this Court in that he supplied excessive
amounts of drugs and alcohol to the defendants, then knowing they
were agitated and under the influence of alcohol and drugs, drove
them to a house several miles away, knowing that the intoxicated
persons were angry at the occupant of the house.

After arriving at

the house, the officer went beyond the use of persistent requests by
taking an active role in an armed robbery which exceeded any
activity perpetrated by either co-defendant.
Officer Droubay and Mr. Colonna first made contact at the
home of Rudy Reed which is located at 4315 West, 3500 South on
December 17, 1986 at about 8:00 p.m. (R. 17, 18, 22, 25, 26). When
Mr. Colonna arrived, Officer Droubay could smell alcohol on Mr.
Colonna's breath (R. 123). Thereafter, Officer Droubay shared some
of the beers from the twelve pack he had brought to the Reed house
with Mr. Colonna (R. 236). During the course of the evening,
Officer Droubay purchased and supplied beer to Mr. Colonna and his
co-defendant, Mr. East on at least three more occasions:

(1) on the

way to purchase cocaine, Officer Droubay purchased a twelve pack of
beer (R. 128), (2) after returning from the cocaine purchase, he
sent Rudy Reed to purchase a twelve pack of beer (R. 267), and (3)
- 14 -

he purchased a pitcher of beer for himself, Mr. colonna and Mr. East
at the Silver Bullet Bar (R. 128, 153, 267). There is no evidence
that anyone other than the officer purchased or supplied beer to Mr.
Colonna and Mr. East the night of the incident.

The officer had no

way of ascertaining how much beer Mr. East or Mr. Colonna drank that
night but each constantly had a beer in his hand (R. 137).
In addition to keeping Mr. Colonna in an endless supply
of beer, Officer Droubay supplied him with marijuana and cocaine.
Officer Droubay brought marijuana to the Reed house (R. 268).
Thereafter, he drove Mr. Colonna and Mr. East to a house in the
vicinity of 2300 East and 3300 South, where he gave Mr. East the
money to purchase a gram of cocaine while the officer and Mr.
Colonna waited in the car (R. 132). After Mr. East purchased the
cocaine and gave it to the officer, Officer Droubay gave a portion
of it to Mr. East and Mr. Colonna, who ingested it (R. 136).
Officer Droubay saw Mr. Colonna ingest cocaine on at least one other
occasion during the approximately two hours he was with Mr. Colonna
prior to the incident involved in this case.

According to the

officer, the cocaine caused Mr. Colonna to become agitated and his
behavior to escalate (R. 139, 142).
In addition to supplying enough alcohol and drugs to Mr.
Colonna to severely impair Colonna1s judgment and to escalate his
behavior, the facts suggest that Officer Droubay ingested enough
drugs and alcohol to impair his own judgment and ability to carry
out his role as an undercover officer.

Officer Droubay conceded

that he had drunk some beers that evening, and Officer Herlynn,
Droubay1s contact officer, had no doubt he had drunk several beers
(R. 227, 240, 251).

Officer Droubay claimed that he merely simulated
"snorting11 cocaine, but his physical description of that procedure
is not possible.

He testified that Manny East held a key with

cocaine on the tip to his nose while the officer was driving.

The

officer held a finger to one nostril, then somehow managed to flip
the cocaine off the key while still using a hand to drive and one
hand on a nostril (R. 136, 251-251).

According to the officer, Mr.

East and Mr. Colonna, who had already expressed concern about
Droubay being a police officer, and were sitting nearby in the car
and leaning over to hold the key to Droubay's nose, did not notice
the cocaine fly off the key, possibly onto the black jacket Droubay
was wearing, where white cocaine particles would have been highly
visible (R. 251-252).

According to Officer Droubay the pair as well

as others present at the Reed house later, also did not notice when
he flicked two lines of cocaine onto the floor (R. 254).
In addition, 640 milligrams of cocaine, almost two-thirds
of a gram, was missing from the bindle when Officer Droubay turned
it into his superiors (R. 263).
Finally, the officer's physical condition the following
day suggested a severe drug hangover or drug involvement rather than
"trauma" as Officer Herlynn suggested.

He did not make contact with

"the outside" until 1:00 p.m. the next day—over twelve hours after
the incident (R. 210-211).

When he first spoke with his control

officer, Officer Droubay was very tense and his voice cracked and
was higher pitched than it was normally (R. 209-200).

His contact

officer met him at a convenience store, not the police station, even
though she planned to put an end to his undercover assignment
- 16 -

(R. 210-211).

When she saw him, he was gray, nauseous, shaking and

sweating profusely even though it was December and they were
outside.

He could not keep down a cup of coffee nor could he speak

coherently (R. 225). Had he been as traumatized as Officer Herlynn
suggested, Officer Droubay would have immediately reported the
incident and made sure that the secretary at the police station with
whom he left messages understood the urgency of his situation and
made contact with other officers for him.
In addition to supplying excessive amounts of beer and
alcohol to Mr. Colonna and Mr. East, Officer Droubay drove to a
house located at 10505 South, 974 East in Sandy, Utah (R. 154). The
evening had begun a significant distance from the Sandy house at
about 4300 West and 3500 South.
the trio with transportation.

Officer Droubay was the member of

After taking Mr. Webber home to Salt

Lake City, the officer began to drive around "aimlessly" (R. 146).
At that time Mr. East had begun talking about Mr. Britton.

Officer

Droubay could easily have driven Mr. East and Mr. Colonna back to
the Reed house and made some excuse for going home, as had Mr.
Webber.

Had Officer Droubay not driven the pair to Sandy, no

robbery would have occurred.
Instead of going to the Reed house, Officer Droubay chose
to stop at a bar in the vicinity of 3500 South and State Street
(R. 146). His stated reason for stopping at the bar was to attempt
to contact other officers in order to get some back up (R. 243-244),
but once inside the bar, he made no effort to use the phone or talk
to the bartender.

He attempted to explain his failure to contact

others by saying he was worried East and Colonna would figure out
- 17 -

that he was an officer (R. 244). However, that concern, if it
existed, would have been just as paramount prior to the stop at the
bar.

Nothing happened at the bar to require a change in plans; had

Officer Droubay planned to make contact when he stopped, he simply
changed his mind.
The stop at the bar did afford Manny East an opportunity
to telephone Mr. Britton and set up their arrival at his house
(R. 150). While still in the bar, it was clear that Mr. East was
very angry at Mr. Britton, inebriated and believed Officer Droubay
was going to drive him to the Britton house.

However, the officer

testified that he had no idea "what was going down" (R. 245).
Nevertheless, he believed he had only three options while still in
the bar:

(1) "identify (himself) as a police officer, and take this

situation from there", (2) "try and get away or bow out in any way
possible" or (3) "go with it and try and maintain the situation to
the best of my ability" (R. 150). Apparently, due either to his
impaired judgment or lack of training, the officer did not consider
telling Mr. East and Mr. Colonna that they should calm down and not
go to the Britton house, even though while in the bar he had felt
comfortable telling the pair that Mr. Colonna was out of control and
needed to calm down (R. 148). Nor did the officer consider refusing
to drive out to Sandy or pretending to be drunk, as Mr. Webber had,
so that he could leave.

Had Officer Droubay refused to drive the

pair to Sandy, he could have followed them and, in the event they
managed to obtain transportation, contacted a back up officer and
followed them to Sandy.
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In addition, the officer's decision that his best option
of the three he considered was to take the pair to the victimfs
house even though they were inebriated and angry at Mr. Britton and
Mr. Colonna was agitated and carrying a gun, shows faulty judgment.
Officer Droubay had been undercover five and a half months (R. 16);
the typical undercover assignment last six months (R. 25). Since he
would be taken out of undercover operations soon, protecting his
identity as a police officer was of little importance.

Identifying

himself as a police officer at the bar would have been preferable to
delivering two men who were intoxicated, talking "big" as a result
of the drugs they had ingested and angry at Mr. Britton to Mr.
Britton's house.
Once the trio arrived at Mr. Britton's house, Officer
Droubay actively participated in the robbery.

The officer wore

gloves and was the only person to hit Mr. Britton (R. 188, 198). He
hit Mr. Britton three or four times in the back of the head and
twice on the nose (R. 197). He pulled Mr. Britton's fingers apart
and threatened to cut one off (R. 187, 197). He went through Mr.
Britton's wallet and took his money (R. 197). He told Mr. Colonna
to take Britton's leather jacket, but Mr. Colonna refused.

Officer

Droubay wanted to take Mr. Britton's rifle, but Mr. Colonna stopped
him (R. 190). Mr. Colonna also refused to take the engine manifold
(R. 156). While at the Britton house, Mr. Colonna did not do much
of anything except "holler" (R. 193). Officer Droubay claimed Mr.
Colonna held a gun on Mr. Britton but the victim said Mr. East and
Officer Droubay held the gun on him during most of the incident.
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Subsection (2) of Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 provides:
(2) The defense of entrapment shall be unavailable
when causing or threatening bodily injury is an
element of the offense charged and the prosecution
is based on conduct causing or threatening the
injury to a person other than the person
perpetrating the entrapment.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301(1) (1953 as amended).
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course
of commiting a robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm,
knife or a facsimilar of a knife or a deadly weapon;
or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another.
In the present case, Mr. Britton did not sustain serious
bodily injury; the aggravated robbery charge was based on subsection
(a) due to the use of a firearm (R. 12). Such use does not
technically require threatening bodily injury as an element and
therefore the exception of §76-2-303(2) is not applicable.
Furthermore, in the event subsection (2) of Utah Code
Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended) is read to preclude the defense of
entrapment in this case where the officer perpetrating the
entrapment was the only person who used physical force and played a
more active role in the armed robbery than Mr. Colonna, such an
application would violate Mr. Colonna's right to due process under
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Point II of this brief sets forth a distinct argument
that even if this Court does not consider the officer's activity to
be entrapment as a matter of law, Officer Droubay's conduct
nevertheless shocks the conscience and violates fundamental notions
- 20 -

of fairness, thereby violating Mr, Colonna's right to due process
under both Constitutions.

By a similar analysis, in the event this

Court determines that the officer's conduct would be entrapment but
for the language of subsection (2) of Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953
as amended) to allow such subsection to preclude an entrapment
defense would constitute a further due process violation.
As outlined in Point II, outrageous police conduct in
some instances can amount to a violation of due process (See
discussion pages 22-32).

If subsection (2) were read to preclude an

entrapment defense in an aggravated robbery where the officer
perpetrated the crime and was involved to a greater extent than the
defendant in hitting and frightening the victim and in taking the
victim's property, such interpretation would violate fundamental
fairness.

While the legislature had the foresight to allow the use

of an entrapment defense in a crime of violence where an officer
entraps an individual and is thereafter the victim of a threat or
bodily injury, it is not clear that it foresaw a situation such as
this where the officer not only entrapped an individual, but then
actively participated in a crime of violence wherein the officer was
the individual assaulting the victim and making threats.

Because

disallowing an entrapment defense based on subsection (2) would
violate due process under the Utah and United States Constitutions,
Mr. Colonna respectfully requests that this Court either interpret
the subsection to allow an entrapment defense in this case or find
that subsection (2) as applied to Mr. Colonna's case violates due
process under Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and therefore
is inapplicable.

_

m

The officer in this case not only presented Mr. East and
Mr. Colonna with an opportunity to commit a robbery by driving them
to Mr. Britton's house, but induced them to commit the crime by
supplying them with alcohol and drugs, then egging them on by
driving them to the victim's home and participating in the robbery
to an extent greater than Mr. Colonnafs participation by threatening
the victim, hitting him numerous times and taking his property.
What started out as "the drugs talking11 with Mr. Colonna and Mr.
East acting tough ended up as an armed robbery only because of the
actions of Officer Droubay.

Such police misconduct amounted to

entrapment as a matter of law and the conviction should therefore be
reversed and the matter remanded for dismissal.
POINT II. MR. COLONNAfS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AS
GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
WAS VIOLATED BY THE OFFICER'S OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT.
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
. . . nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty or property, without due process of
law;
In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the United
States Supreme Court held that police conduct was so outrageous that
it violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and reversed the defendant's conviction.

In that case,

officers entered the defendant's home and questioned him regarding
two capsules which were on a nightstand beside the table.

The

defendant put the capsules in his mouth and swallowed them after tihe
officers struggled to extract them from his mouth.
- 22 -

Thereafter,

officers handcuffed Rochin and took him to a hospital where "a
doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube in Rochin's stomach
against his will" at 166.

The procedure induced vomiting and the

two capsules, later found to contain morphine, were recovered.

The

Court found that the officers' conduct "shocks the conscience" and
refused to affirm the convictions obtained as a result.

Id. at 172.

The Rochin Court stated:
Regard for the requirements of the Due Process
Clause" inescapably imposes upon this Court an
exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the
proceedings [resulting in conviction] in order to
ascertain whether they offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking people even toward those
charged with the most heinous offenses" (citations
omitted) . Id[. at 169.
In Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971),
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that while the activity
carried on by government agents did not fit within an entrapment
defense since the defendants had a predisposition to commit the
crime, it was nevertheless "repugnant to American criminal justice"
(Id. at 787) and reversed the conviction.

In that case, the Court

determined that the governments conduct was "substantially more
intense and aggressive than the level of such activity charged
against the Government in numerous entrapment cases."

rd. at 787.

The government in Greene reestablished contact with the
defendants after a raid on their bootlegging operation.

The agent

was substantially involved in the operation and helped to establish
and sustain it.

Furthermore, he applied pressure to the defendants

to prod them into the production of illegal alcohol.
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While the

Court did not explicitly reach its decision on due process grounds,
the due process rationale is implicit in the opinion.
in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1971) the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged in dictum that the Court
"may someday be presented with a situation in which the conduct of
law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction. . ."

Id. at 431-432.

In Russell, the

defendant presented a two prong argument for reversal:

(1) the

conviction should be reversed because the defendant was entrapped;
and (2) the conviction should be reversed because "a government
investigator was so enmeshed in the criminal activity that the
prosecution of the defendants was repugnant to the American justice
system (citations omitted)."

Id. at 428. While the Court

recognized that a due process violation may occur in an entrapment
context based on the outrageous conduct of the government, it held
that the conduct in Russell, "stop(ped) far short of violating . . .
'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice1
mandated by the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment"
(Citations omitted.)

Id. at 432.

The officer in Russell supplied defendants with
propanone, a difficult to obtain and necessary ingredient in the
manufacture of methamphetamine.

The Russell Court reasoned that

manufacture of drugs is an ongoing, illegal business enterprise, and
that infiltration and limited involvement by officers is a necessary
and practical means to investigate drug related crimes.
Furthermore, the substance supplied by the officer was not illegal.
- 24 -

Hence, "(l)aw enforcement tactics such as this can hardly be said to
violate 'fundamental fairness1 or be 'shocking to the universal
sense of justice'".

(Citations omitted.)

Id.

at 432.

in People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1978), the New
York Court of Appeals analyzed the status of federal due process
claims that a matter should be dismissed based on outrageous conduct
by police officers where an entrapment defense is not available due
to the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime.

The Isaacson

Court decided that such a defense under the federal constitution
still exists, but went on to decide the case on state due process
grounds (See discussion infra at 29-30).

The Isaacson Court was

concerned about the plurality opinion in Hampton v. United States,
425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976) wherein three
justices ruled out a due process argument where the defendant was
predisposed to commit a crime.

Because the remaining justices were

unwilling to join that opinion, the Supreme Court has not ruled out
a due process argument even where a defendant was predisposed to
commit the crime.
In United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744
(N.D. Calif. 1981), the United States District Court for Northern
California pointed out that "the Ninth circuit (Court of Appeals)
has continued to recognize the defense since [United States v.]
Russell, and has held explicitly that it survived the plurality's
opinion in Hampton v. United States, Id. at 751. In
Bartres-Santolino, supra at 751, the Court noted in footnote 6 that
"(a)lmost all of the cases rejecting an outrageous government
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conduct defense involve defendants who have previously been involved
in similar crimes and/or a criminal enterprise that was already in
progress at the time government agents became involved (citations
omitted)."

Although the defendants in Bartres-Santolino had some

culpability, "they were not embarked or about to embark on any
criminal activity until the government agents set in motion the
operation."

Id. at 752. The activity of the agents in that case

shocked the universal sense of justice and violated due process
principles of fundamental fairness.
In United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978),
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a conviction based on a
due process violation as a result of outrageous police misconduct.
That case also involved the manufacture of illicit drugs, and the
Court pointed out that the case, unlike cases rejecting the defense
did not involve the investigation of an existing criminal enterprise.
In State v. Fixel, 68 Utah Adv. Reports 3 (Nov. 2, 1987),
this Court acknowledged in dictum that conduct of law enforcement
officials may be so outrageous that due process principles would
preclude the government from using judicial processes to obtain a
conviction, but pointed out that in that case "defendant does not
contend and we do not perceive that (the officer's) conduct was in
any respect sufficient to preclude the invocation of judicial
processes against defendant on the basis of a due process
violation."

Id. at 4.
In the present case, the actions of Officer Droubay shock

the conscience and offend traditional notions of fairness and
justice, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment due process
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clause.

As previously outlined, Officer Droubay supplied Mr.

Colonna and Mr. East with substantial amounts of cocaine and beer
(See discussion at 14-15).

By supplying them with cocaine, he

violated departmental policies which required that once an officer
obtained a substance, he not give any to suspects (R. 141, 135). In
addition, the evidence supports a conclusion that Officer Droubay
was himself intoxicated on beer and cocaine (See discussion pages
15-17).

Departmental regulations allow consumption of alcohol but

prohibit consumption of controlled substances (R. 235).
Furthermore, ingestion of cocaine is a felony under Utah statutory
law (See Utah Code Ann. §58-37-1 et seq (1953 as amended).
Officer Droubay delivered Mr. East and Mr. Colonna to the
Britton house even though he knew they were agitated, intoxicated
and angry at Mr. Britton and even though he could have taken them
back to the Reed house, located a substantial distance from the
Britton house, made up an excuse to leave, then contacted back up
and followed them in the unlikely event the pair left the Reed house
for the Britton house (See discussion pages 17-18).
Perhaps most shocking is Officer Droubay's actual
involvement in an armed robbery.

As previously discussed, Officer

Droubay was the only individual to hit Mr. Britton; he hit him five
to six times on the nose and back of the head (R. 197). He made the
bulk of the threats and Mr. Britton was in fact most frightened of
Officer Droubay (R. 187, 188, 190, 196, 197). The officer took Mr.
Britton's money and urged Mr. Colonna, who refused to follow such
suggestions, to take Mr. Britton's jacket and rifle (R. 190, 196,
197).

The officer was the actual perpetrator of the armed robbery;
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Mr. Colonna just stood around hollering (R. 193), and although he
may have briefly held a gun on Mr. Britton, Mr. Britton was not
frightened of that behavior.
The record does not establish similar prior offenses by
Mr. Colonna or a "predisposition" to commit the crime.
did, the defense would be available.

Even if it

However, the fact that the

officer was involved at the inception and Mr. Colonna lacked
"predisposition to commit the crime or history of committing similar
crimes "strengthens the argument.

Because there was no showing that

Mr. Colonna had been involved in similar crimes or that the criminal
activity was in progress, the case does not fall within the cases
where the defense has been rejected, as pointed out in United States
v. Bartres-Santolino, supra.
This case differs significantly from those generally
discussing the defense of police misconduct in an entrapment context
since it involves an armed robbery rather than the manufacture or
sale of drugs.

No significant police purpose and no purpose to

prevent crime was served.

The officer acted outrageously in a

violent departure from his assigned task of ferreting out persons
involved in drug trade.

Activity by a police officer such as this

should not be tolerated; it goes beyond that limited involvement in
drug trade allowed in Russell and shocks the conscience and our
traditional notions of fairness.

As was the case in Greene, the

government activity was "substantially more intense and aggressive
than the level of such activity charged against the Government in
numerous entrapment cases". Greene v. United States, supra at 787.
Because of the Fourteenth Amendment violation, the use of judicial
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processes to obtain a conviction in this case should not be
permitted.
Article I, §7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.
The language is similar to that of the Fourteenth Amendment and
therefore the argument set forth above is applicable to the Utah due
process provision.

Furthermore, in the event this Court determines

that federal due process was not violated, it nevertheless is free
to interpret the Utah Constitution to provide greater protections
than the federal constitution and find that state due process was
violated by Officer Droubay's outrageous conduct.

See "Recent

Developments in Utah Law", 1987 Ut. L. Rev. 79; See also State v.
Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986).
In State v. Earl, supra, this Court stated it would
follow the technique for analyzing state constitutional questions
set forth by the Supreme Court of Vermont in State v. Jewett, 500
A.2d 233 (1985).

This Court stated the reason for considering state

constitutional standards separate from federal constitutional
standards is that "we are aware that the states are relying with
increasing frequency on an analysis of the provisions of their own
constitutions to expand constitutional protection beyond that
mandated by the United States Supreme Court."

Earl at 805.

In Jewett, the Vermont Supreme Court stated guidelines
that may be considered in determining a state constitutional issue
include historical materials, a textual analysis, a sibling statefs
approach, and economic and sociological materials.
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Jewett at

236-238.

And as the United States Supreme Court stated in State v.

Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201, 103 S.Ct. 3469 (1983) "it is
fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in
interpreting their state constitutions."

Long, L.Ed.2d at 1214-15.

In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), this Court
held that the due process clause in the Utah Constitution prohibits
the refiling of criminal charges absent a showing of new or
additional evidence or other good cause.

This Court noted that as

the federal law on this point was unsettled, it was better to
address the issue under the state constitution.
While this Court has not directly addressed the issue of
whether outrageous police misconduct violates the State due process
clause, without referring specifically to the State or Federal
Constitution, this Court acknowledged that outrageous police
misconduct may violate due process in State v. Fixel, supra.
In People v. Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1978), the New
York Court of Appeals held that government action violated due
process under the state constitution.

The Court focused on several

factors, none of which was alone determinative, but each of which
"should be viewed in combination with all pertinent aspects and in
the context of proper law enforcement objectives—the prevention of
crime and the apprehension of violators, rather than the
encouragement of and participation in sheer lawlessness."
83.

Id. at

Those factors are:
(1) whether the police manufactured a crime which
otherwise would not likely have occurred, or merely
involved themselves in an ongoing criminal activity
(citations omitted); (2) whether the police
themselves engaged in criminal of improper conduct
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repugnant to a sense of justice (citations
omitted); (3) whether the defendant's reluctance to
commit the crime is overcome by appeals to
humanitarian instincts such as sympathy or past
friendship, by temptation of exorbitant gain, or by
persistent solicitation in the face of unwillingness
(citations omitted); and (4) whether the record
reveals simply a desire to obtain a conviction with
no reading that the police motive is to prevent
further crime or protect the populace.
Id. at 83.
The Isaacson Court stated further that "(a)s a bare
minimum, there should be a purposeful eschewal of illegality or
egregious foul play.

A prosecution conceived in or nurtured by such

conduct, as exemplified in these guidelines, so as to cast aside and
mock 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of
justice' should be forbidden under traditional due process
principles".

IQ. at 82.

In the present case, Officer Droubay was involved in the
aggravated robbery from its inception; there was no ongoing criminal
activity in the context of this crime.

Officer Droubay himself

engaged in illegal conduct in assaulting Mr. Britton, threatening
him, and taking his money.

Mr. Colonna refused to actually take two

items from Mr. Britton; the officer's supplying Mr. Colonna with
drugs then delivering him at Mr. Britton's house after the drugs
made Colonna 'talk big' helped overcome any reluctance Mr. Colonna
might have had.

Officer Droubay's criminal involvement and violent

actions further prodded Mr. Colonna.

Finally, the record shows that

the State simply wanted a conviction in this case; nothing reflects
a governmental interest in preventing further crime or even the
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crime in this case.

Hence, all four prongs suggested in Isaacson

were met in this case.
Although the State's interest in combatting illegal drug
trade permits the infiltration of undercover officers into the drug
world and the purchasing of illegal substances, it is questionable
whether that interest justifies an officer supplying such substances
to others or ingesting large quantities of such substances himself.
Even if such governmental interest can be stretched to include such
providing and ingestion, it cannot be stretched to include the
perpetration of an armed robbery under the circumstances of this
case.

Officer Droubay's outrageous conduct is repugnant to the

American system of justice and is violative of the due process under
the State and Federal Constitutions; therefore judicial processes
may not be invoked in this case to sustain a conviction (See Greene
v. United States, supra).
Because Mr. Colonna's conviction rests on the outcome of
this appeal, this Court should address this issue on direct appeal
even though counsel failed to object to the due process violations
at trial.

See State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983).

Mr.

Colonna respectfully requests that this case be reversed and
remanded to district court with an order that the charge against him
be dismissed.
POINT III. MR. COLONNA WAS DENIED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Mr. Colonna was denied his right to a fair trial and
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
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Constitution.

The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue

of effective assistance of counsel in the companion cases, United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In Cronic, the Court emphasized that effective

advocacy is the pillar upon which our system of justice is founded.
Without effective advocacy, the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a fair
trial suffers.
In Strickland, the court established a two prong test for
analysis of the effective assistance of counsel.

First, the Court

required the defendant to show a deficiency in counsel's
performance.

The Court defined "deficient performance" as that

falling below an "objective" standard of reasonableness.

The second

prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to show that the
deficiency prejudiced the defense.

To prove prejudice, the

defendant must show that, but for counselfs unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a "probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome."

466 U.S. at 694.

This Court's ruling on ineffectiveness of counsel have
been consistent with Cronic and Strickland.

In State v. McNicol,

554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976), this court stated:
[T]he right of the accused to have counsel is not
satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appearance in
the record by an attorney who manifests no real
concern about the interests of the accused. He is
entitled to the assistance of a competent member of
the Bar, who shows a willingness to identify himself
with the interests of the accused and present such
defenses as are available under the law and
consistent with the ethics of the profession,
(footnotes omitted).
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This Court in State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1203 (Utah
1984) held, that in reviewing the effectiveness of counsel argument
the following factors should be considered:
(1) The burden of establishing inadequate
representation is on the defendant, "and proof of
such must be demonstrable reality and not a
speculative matter." (2) A lawyer's "legitimate
exercise of judgment" in the choice of trial
strategy or tactics that did not produce the
anticipated result does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel, (3) It must appear that any
deficiency in the performance of counsel was
prejudicial. (citations omitted).
This Court has defined prejudice as a reasonable
likelihood that without counsel's error, a different result would
have occurred.

State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1979).

While

this Court acknowledged a standard for ineffectiveness claims which
is higher than that of Strickland, it stated that it would "defer to
the federal standard for prejudice where a defendant claims a sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been
violated."

Lairby, 699 P.2d at 1205.

Thus, the standard for

ineffective assistance of counsel claims seems to require a
reasonable probability that but for the defense counsel's errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A.

COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE FOR
TRIAL AS A RESULT OF HIS FAILURE TO PROPERLY
PLEA BARGAIN.

In the instant case, performance by defense counsel was
first deficient because of his failure to engage in plea bargaining
on behalf of Mr. Colonna.

As the court stated in State v. Lamas,

666 P.2d 94, 98 (Ariz. App. 1983), "it is by now elemental that
effective assistance of counsel is just as necessary at the plea
bargaining stage as the trial."
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In granting a petition for habeas corpus the court in
Cole v. Slayton, 378 F. Supp. 364 (W.D.Va. 1974) held that defense
counsel was ineffective because of his failure to attempt to plea
bargain.

In Cole, defense counsel argued that he had nothing to

bargain with but the court stated, "no matter how overwhelming their
guilt [all defendants] have one bargaining point—the plea itself."
Id. at 368.
in People v. Brown, 223 Cal. Rptr. 66, 77 (Cal. App. 3d
Dist. 1986) the court developed a test to determine ineffective
assistance claims in the plea bargaining process.

The Court stated:

[W]e believe an appropriate test of prejudice in
cases where it is claimed that counsel has
inadequately pursued or perfected plea negotiations
is to determine whether, absence counsel's failings,
it is reasonably probable defendant would have had
the opportunity to present a beneficial plea bargain
to the court for its approval or rejection.
Id. at 77.
In a per curiam opinion in State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645
(Utah 1985), this Court pointed out that the state and federal
constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains.
646.

Id. at

In that case, the defendant did not enter into a plea bargain

due to counsel's failure to investigate the case, in footnote 7 of
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), this Court cited State v.
Geary and stated:
We are dealing here with the outcome of trial, not
the outcome of plea bargaining. . . . We have
previously rejected claims alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel when a defendant has rejected
a plea bargain and has retained his or her right to
a fair trial.
Id. at 919.
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In the present casef unlike the defendant in Geary, Mr.
Colonna did not reject a plea bargain; he in fact attempted to
accept a plea ^bargain, but was denied the opportunity due to
counsel's failure to familiarize himself with the rules of the court
(R. 315). Had counsel been familiar with the rules, Mr. Colonna
would have been convicted of simple robbery.
In addition, had counsel been aware that Mr. Colonna
would not be permitted to enter into a plea bargain on the day of
trial, he would have made more of an effort to adequately prepare
for trial.

At least four examples of lack of preparation for trial

appear in the the record.

First, Mr. Colonna appeared in dirty

clothing he had been wearing the night of his arrest (Addendum A ) .
A properly prepared attorney would have obtained clean and
presentable clothing for Mr. Colonna to wear before the jury.

In

Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980), this Court recognized a
defendant's fundamental right to appear in clean, respectable
clothing before a jury.

Second, as discussed infra at 37-38, Mr.

Colonna's attorney did not file a pretrial entrapment motion.

Had

such a motion been filed, Mr. Colonna could have taken the stand to
establish missing details from the evening in question and the judge
would have been adequately briefed on entrapment as a matter of
law.

Third, trial counsel would have known that testimony regarding

past offenses was inadmissible where entrapment was a defense and
the defendant did not testify.

Therefore, he would have objected to

testimony on direct examination regarding Mr. Colonna's past
offenses and moved for a mistrial.

(See discussion infra at 40-41.)
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Finally, defense counsel failed to move to dismiss the
information based on the violation of due process caused by the
officerfs outrageous conduct in this case (See Point II at 22-32).
B.

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY PRESENT
THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(4) (1953 as amended) outlines
the appropriate procedure to be followed in advancing a defense of
entrapment.

That subsection provides:

(4) Upon written motion of the defendant, the
court shall hear evidence on the issue and shall
determine as a matter of fact and law whether the
defendant was entrapped to commit the offense.
Defendant's motion shall be made at least ten days
before trial except the court for good cause shown
may permit a later filing.
In the present case, defense counsel did not file a motion ten days
before trial as provided for in subsection 4.

Had such a motion

been filed, Mr. Colonna would have been afforded the opportunity to
put on evidence, including his own testimony, as to the details of
the evening in question.

The trial court would then have determined

as a matter of fact and law, whether Officer Droubay entrapped Mr.
Colonna.
After the close of evidence, the trial court stated that
had an entrapment motion been filed, the court would have denied it
(R. 297). However, it is difficult for the trial court to determine
how it would have ruled if an adequately prepared motion, including
evidence which might not otherwise be presented to a jury and briefs
outlining the applicable law had been presented.
As outlined in Point II, Officer Droubay's behavior in
supplying excessive amounts of drugs and alcohol to Mr. Colonna and
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Mr. East, driving them to the home of the victim when he knew the
parties were angry, agitated and intoxicated and actively
participating in a robbery by hitting and threatening the victim
numerous times amounted to entrapment.

Had defense counsel

presented a motion to the trial court, put on evidence and briefed
the issue, Mr. Colonna would have had the benefit of the trial
Court's factual as well as legal determination.

Given the

outrageous conduct by Officer Droubay, the trial court may well have
determined entrapment occurred.
Furthermore, as outlined in subsection (c) infra, defense
counsel did not object to testimony regarding Mr. Colonna's past
offenses as proscribed by Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303 (1953 as amended).
Had defense counsel adequately presented the entrapment
defense, it is reasonably probable that the outcome of this case
would have been different in that either the judge or jury would
have found that the outrageous conduct of Officer Droubay entrapped
Mr. Colonna.
C.

DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT OR MOVE FOR
MISTRIAL AFTER OFFICER ALLUDED TO PAST OFFENSES
OF MR. COLONNA IN DIRECT TESTIMONY.

Defense counsel failed to object or otherwise attempt to
control the questioning by the prosecutor and Officer Droubay's
responses in regard to Mr. Colonna's background, reputation, prior
acts and criminal record.
The prosecutor asked Officer Droubay early in his
testimony:
Q:

After Mr. East came in, what happened?

A: He came in and made the statement, something to the
effect that Jack had taken the gun away from somebody at
sometime or on some kind of deal on the street.
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(R. 121)
Rule 801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) defines
hearsay as an out of court statement offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted.

This hearsay statement was

attributed to Mr. East and offered by the State to establish that
Mr. Colonna was a bad character involved in some kind of illegal
activity involving guns.

Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

(1983) provides that hearsay is generally inadmissible.

This

statement attributed to Mr. East was inadmissible hearsay; defense
counsel should have objected on those grounds.
In addition, Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
(1983) allows the trial court to exclude evidence where the
prejudicial impact of such evidence outweighs its probative value.
This statement was of minimal probative value.

The origin of the

gun was irrelevant to whether Mr. Colonna participated in the armed
robbery involved in this case.

The only possible relevance of such

testimony would be to show prior misconduct or crime committed by
Mr. Colonna so as to establish his character as a bad person and
show that he acted in conformity therewith on the night of this
incident.

Such evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts to show

that the person acted in conformity therewith is inadmissible
pursuant to the express language of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence (1983). 1

The prejudicial effect of evidence regarding use

1

While Rules 404(b) does provide exceptions making such evidence
admissible "for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake
or accident", none of those exceptions are applicable to the
officerfs unreliable and unsubstantiated statement.
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of guns and prior incidents where the defendant used a gun to
threaten someone has been recognized in Rule 403(b), Rule 609 and
cases discussing the prejudicial effect of prior crimes.
In addition, the entrapment statute expressly excludes
evidence of past offenses of the defendant,

Utah Code Ann.

§76-2-303(6) states:
(6) In any hearing before a judge or jury where
the defense of entrapment is an issue, past offenses
of the defendant shall not be admitted except that
in a trial where the defendant testifies he may be
asked of his past convictions for felonies and any
testimony given by the defendant at a hearing on
entrapment may be used to impeach his testimony at
trial.
In State v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (Utah 1979), the officer testified
on direct examination concerning previous transactions by the
defendant involving stolen property.

This Court held that such

testimony on direct examination constituted reversible error.
Similarly, Officer Droubay's hearsay testimony suggesting
a prior robbery or "deal on the street" involving guns was testimony
on direct regarding prior offenses and therefore inadmissible
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(6) (1953 as amended) since
entrapment was an issue in this case.
This statement, especially when considered in conjunction
with Officer Droubay's other improperly admitted statements
regarding Mr. Colonna's background and arrest record, as discussed
below, suggested to the jury that Mr. Colonna was a person of bad
character who was prone to violence.

The prejudicial impact of such

bad character evidence suggesting prior crimes or wrongs, by a
defendant, has been recognized by the Utah Legislature by requiring
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separate trials where a defendant is charged with being an habitual
criminal and this Court where the defendant is charged with
possession of a weapon by a restricted person.

See Utah Code Ann.

§76-8-1002 and State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985).

In

addition, where the defense of entrapment is a issue, this Court
recognized the prejudicial impact of such testimony in State v.
Hansen, supra.
Hence, defense counsel was deficient in failing to object
to the testimony on any one of four grounds:

(1) hearsay pursuant

to Rules 801 and 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; (2) the enormous
prejudicial effect outweighed its minimal probative value pursuant
to Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence; (3) it was evidence of
prior wrongs offered to show that Mr. Colonna acted in conformity
therewith, in violation of Rule 404(b); and (4) pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §76-2-303(6) (1953 as amended) the evidence of past
offenses was inadmissible in this case where entrapment was in issue
and Mr. Colonna did not testify.
Shortly after Officer Droubay testified regarding Mr.
East's statement as to the origin of Mr. Colonna's gun, the
following question and answer between the prosecutor and officer
occurred:
Mr. Christensen: Do you recall what conversations
you would have had in this type of conversation that
you had (sic)?
Officer Droubay: Just that I asked Jack if he had
ever been arrested. He told me he had. I asked him
if he had ever been roughed up and he said he had.
(T. 33)
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Again, defense counsel failed to object to the testimony.

As

previously discussed, Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
(1983) does not allow evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts to
show that the defendant acted in conformity therewith*

Again, none

of the exceptions of Rule 404(b) are applicable since the testimony
was elicited to show that Mr. Colonna has a bad character, not to
show that he had the motive, opportunity etc. to commit the
aggravated robbery.

While Rule 609 of the Otah Rules of Evidence

(1983) allows the use of evidence of prior crimes to be admitted in
certain instances for the purpose of attacking credibility of a
witness it does not allow for testimony regarding arrests (rather
than convictions) nor does it allow for admission of convictions in
a case such as this where the defendant did not testify.

In

addition, Utah Code Ann. §76-2-303(6) (1953 as amended) explicitly
proscribes such evidence on direct examination when entrapment is an
issue as previously discussed.

While the confusing nature of the

prosecutor's question might not have drawn an objection, defense
counsel performed deficiently in failing to object immediately when
Officer Droubay testified that he had asked Mr. Colonna whether he
had been previously arrested.
Both the Utah Legislature and this Court have recognized
the prejudicial impact of evidence regarding prior arrests or
convictions.

Where a defendant is charged with being an Habitual

Criminal, Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1002 (1953 as amended) requires a
bifurcated trial on that charge so that the jury's fact finding task
will not be tainted by evidence of the defendant's prior convictions.
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In State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985) this Court
recognized the prejudicial impact of evidence of prior convictions
on a jury's deliberations, and held that the trial court's refusal
to sever Burglary and Theft charges from the charge of Possession of
a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person was reversible error.
This Court stated in Saunders;
The basis of these limitations on the admissibility
of evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a
fact finder to convict the accused because of bad
character rather than because he is shown to be
guilty of the offenses charged. Because of this
tendency, such evidence is presumed prejudicial and,
absent a reason for the admission of the evidence
other than to show criminal disposition, the
evidence is excluded.
Id. at 741 (footnote omitted).
The failure of defense counsel to object to this highly
prejudicial testimony tainted the jury's perception of Mr. Colonna;
while the evidence strongly suggested official misconduct and
entrapment by Officer Droubay (See Points I and II), the jury was
unlikely to find such entrapment since the state used inadmissible
evidence to paint a picture of Mr. Colonna as a violent man,
involved in street deals involving guns and prior arrests where
officers roughed him up.

Had Mr. Colonna been adequately

represented, such information would not have been before the jury.
Defense counsel also failed to object to the following
testimony:
Mr. Christensen; As you pulled over, describe for
the jury what transpired in terms of your contact
with the police, their contact with you, and any of
the occupants you had in the car with you.
Officer Droubay: As we were being pulled over, my
first thought was that they may be they had noticed
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Mr. Colonna in the car due to some of my background
investigation. Mr. Colonna is very well known in
West Valley City, Magna so forth.
(R. 129-130).
Defense counsel should have made an immediate objection
that the answer was nonresponsive, speculative and lacking in
foundation.

Officer Droubay was simply trying to get in testimony

that Mr. Colonna was a well known bad actor.

The statement did not

answer the prosecutorfs question, nor did he offer a foundation for
such statement.

The cumulative effect of this testimony with the

other two instances set forth above was to suggest to the jury that
Mr. Colonna had committed prior offenses, was a bad character who
repeatedly caused trouble and on the night in question, was acting
in conformity with such character.

As previously outlined, such

evidence of prior bad acts and crimes is generally considered highly
prejudicial especially where entrapment is a defense.

Counsel

should have objected to all three lines of questioning, attempted to
limit the testimony by asking the court to direct the witness
(outside the presence of the jury) to not discuss such topics and
moved for a mistrial based on the prejudicial impact singly and
cumulatively of the three statements.

His failure to do so

prejudiced Mr. Colonna's case since the jury had a tainted view of
him, based on inadmissible evidence, whereby it was highly unlikely
they would find Mr. Colonna was entrapped or not guilty of the crime
charged.
Had the jury not been presented with the information in
these three examples, there is a reasonable probability in light of
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cne outrageous government conduct that their decision would have
been different.
D.

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO
MOVE TO DISMISS THE INFORMATION BASED ON THE
OFFICER'S OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT.

As outlined in Point II of this brief at 22-32, the
outrageous conduct by Officer Droubay violated Mr. Colonna's right
to due process of law under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

Defense counsel did not make a motion to dismiss on

such grounds, nor did he argue in anyway that Mr. Colonna's due
process rights were violated.

A successful motion of this nature

would have resulted in dismissal of the charges; therefore,
counsel's deficient performance in failing to make such a motion
prejudiced Mr. Colonna.
Based on the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial,
Mr. Colonna respectfully requests that this court reverse the
conviction and remand the case to Third District Court for a new
trial.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant seeks
reversal of his conviction and remand of his case to the District
Court for dismissal of the charges or in the alternative a new trial
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this g

day of December, 1987.

GEORGE (jffADDOUPS
Attorney for Appellant

^tU-C akC&i
JOAN C . WATT

Attorney for Appellant
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I, GEORGE WADDOUPS, hereby certify that ten copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney
General's office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114 this
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DELIVERED by

this
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ADDENDUM A

GEORGE T. WADDOUPS (#3965)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH

:

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT

Plaintiff
v.

:

JACK NEIL COLONNA,

:
:

Defendant

Case No. CR-87-12
JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
Case No. 870136

I, JACK NEIL COLONNA, after having been duly sworn
according to law on my oath depose and say:
1.

That I am the defendant in the above-entitled case,

and have been incarcerated since December 22, 1986.
2.

That I was represented by Mr. Stan Adams.

3.

That during the representation on my case, and even

after my requests, Mr. Adams only came to the Salt Lake County Jail
once to discuss my case.
4.

This visit took part in February 1987.

Approximately two and half weeks before trial, Mr.

Adams in our phone conversation said he was going to discuss a plea
bargain with the prosecutor.

I did not hear back from Mr. Adams

about the plea agreement until the morning of trial.

At that time,

I agreed to the plea agreement in Judge Fredericks Chambers.

Judge

Frederick refused to accept the agreement because the Jury had been
called and Mr. Adams did not notify the court about the plea
agreement ten days in advance.

Apparently, both Mr. Adams and the
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plea to a lesser included charge.

„

The agreement was that I would

plead to a Simple Robbery, a second degree felony, and the State
would dismiss the remaining charges.
5.

Since Judge Frederick refused the plea agreement, I was

tried in my dirty cloths that I had been booked in months ago. I
requested of Mr. Adams, earlier, if we go to trial, to get me some
clean cloths.
6.

He could do this by contacting my Dad.

Mr. Adams would not let me testify.

He did not call

witnesses that I thought would be helpful to my case.
7.

My attorney was not prepared and he did not effectively

represent me before trial or at trial.
DATED this > V

day of August, 1987.

ztfACK NEIL COLONNA
Utah State Prison

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this r//
1987.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in
My Commission Expires:
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'—"day of August

